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ABSTRACT 
 
 Many modern intellectual property scholars have argued that the creation of patents and 
copyrights, for inventions and writings, respectively, should be resisted on the ground that these 
forms of property necessarily infringe ordinary forms of liberty, in contrast to property that is 
found in tangible things. This article rejects that claim by showing how property conflicts with 
liberty in both settings, but that the different configurations of rights observed in these various 
areas is defensible on the ground that the loss of liberty for all persons is, to the extent that human 
institutions can make it, compensated by the increased utility generated by the various property 
rights in question. The appropriate approach to intellectual property is not abolition but fine-
tuning in an effort to increase the gains from intellectual property generally.  
 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to recanvass what is surely old and familiar territory 
about the defenses, if any, that can be made for various forms of intellectual property—
and for the purposes of this conference, particularly copyright—as a matter of both 
natural law and utilitarian theory, broadly conceived. In dealing with this issue, it is 
important to note that within the Lockean tradition, the function of representative 
government is to protect the lives, liberties and estates of the individuals who, as subjects 
or citizens, are subject to the exercise of state power.1 There is little doubt that this 
formulation of the matter has exerted profound influence over the structure of American 
thought and constitutionalism. For instance, it is not necessary to look any further than 
                                                 
*James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago; The Peter and 
Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution. My thanks to Eric Murphy for his valuable 
research assistance. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Progress and Freedom Foundation 
Conference on Intellectual Property held in Washington D.C. on June 10, 2003, and at workshops at the 
University of Chicago, Fordham and Stanford Law Schools. 
1JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT: SECOND TREATISE ch. IX, ¶ 123 (1689) (“This [the insecurity of 
a state of nature] which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason 
that he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to 
unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, 
property.”). 
the two constitutional commands that provide that no individual be deprived (by either 
state or national government) of life, liberty or property without due process of law.2 For 
these purposes there are two elements of this formulation that deserve some brief 
mention. First, the phrase “without due process of law” has been long, if controversially, 
understood to cover situations in which individuals are deprived of life, liberty or 
property without just compensation.3 In this regard, the due process clauses mirror the 
more specific language of the takings clause, which provides “nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.”4 But for our purposes, the more 
important claim within this clause is the ostensible parity between liberty and property in 
the constellation of constitutionality, and by implication, political values. 
This yoking together of liberty and property has an obvious appeal for individuals 
who operate within the classical liberal tradition and view private property in its various 
manifestations as consistent with a regime of personal liberty. But notwithstanding the 
ease by which it is possible to run these two phrases together, it hardly follows that this 
coupling should be regarded as a necessary truth, to be denied only on pain of self-
contradiction.5 In fact a complete defense of both liberty and property requires a 
painstaking examination of the strength of each of these claims separately. Indeed, it 
requires some ingenuity to defend the ostensible parity between liberty and property 
when we deal with property in the tangible realm. The doubts about the parallelism 
between the two are, if anything, even more insistent in the realm of intellectual property. 
                                                 
2U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV. The former applies to the national government, and the latter to the 
states.  
3See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). 
4U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
5See, e.g., Tom G. Palmer, Are Copyrights Morally Justified?, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 43-44 (Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews Jr. ed., 
2002). 
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Some commentators, such as James DeLong6 and Adam Mossoff, see a tight connection 
between natural law and intellectual property.7 But theirs is probably a minority position. 
There are many people who think that the current scope of the copyright laws sets up 
intellectual property in opposition to human liberty of speech and expression, such that in 
the contest between the two, the copyright law comes out second best behind these 
liberties. Thus, Tom Bell, a devoted natural rights Lockean, writes, acerbically: “More 
pointedly, copyright and patent protection contradict Locke’s justification of property. By 
invoking state power, a copyright or patent owner can impose prior restraint, fines, 
imprisonment, and confiscation on those engaged in peaceful expression and the quiet 
enjoyment of their tangible property.”8 Evidently, this sentiment is not confined solely to 
those that come from communitarian or New Deal traditions, who inherently have some 
uneasiness about the growth and expansion of intellectual property. There is also a strong 
undercurrent of discontent about the protection of intellectual property interests among 
those who purport to treat individual freedom as the highest good. The free software and 
the free copyright models show that there is much that unites the   (anarcho-)libertarian 
right with the socialist or (anarcho-)libertarian left.9 Further, Lawrence Lessig and others 
have also echoed this sentiment with their calls for the recognition and promotion of the 
“creative commons.”10  
                                                 
6James V. DeLong, Defending Intellectual Property, in COPY FIGHTS, supra note 5, at 17. 
7Adam Mossoff, Locke’s Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE 155, 155 (2002). For Mossoff’s views on 
the natural law elements in the law of patents, see Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: 
An Intellectual History, 1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255 (2001). 
8Tom W. Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent Law, in COPY FIGHTS, supra note 5, at 4. 
9See DeLong, supra note 6, at 17-18.  
10See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 
86-99 (2001). See also Neil Weinstock, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 
(1996). 
RAE:PFF-Copyright 4/12/04 3 
The modern position thus seeks to place liberty in opposition to property and 
thereby to dissolve the bonds that in ordinary thought link the two together. I think that 
this effort to split the traditional alliance should be rejected, but by arguments that follow 
a route that calls into question much of Locke’s labor theory of value. In this context, 
labor represents a form of liberty because it is a form of individual conduct that purports 
to establish the link between a particular individual and some particular resource, tangible 
or intangible.  
In order to explore the nature of this tension as it applies to copyright, it is critical 
to understand how it plays out in connection with ordinary forms of property as well. Part 
I of this paper, therefore, is an examination of the tension between liberty and property 
within the natural law tradition of Locke who had, it should be noted, little or nothing to 
say about intellectual property as such. Once this basic understanding of the Lockean 
tradition is explicated, it becomes possible in the second portion of the paper to examine 
how the same tension between liberty and property plays out in connection with 
copyright, and by implication, other forms of intellectual property. In the end, it is largely 
proper to yoke together liberty and property, as has been done by our classical liberal 
forebears. However, the analytical path to achieving this result is far more tortuous than 
may appear at first reading.  
Many of the people who oppose copyright protection do so because they think 
that intellectual property rights flunk where tangible property rights succeed. Namely, 
they argue that this failure is the result of the Lockean theory that has, as its essential 
justification for property rights, the three following steps: “Because a creator owns 
himself, 2) he owns his labor and, thus, 3) those intellectual properties with which, by 
RAE:PFF-Copyright 4/12/04 4 
dint of his creative acts, he mixes his labor.”11 Yet it is just here that the argument falters. 
The Lockean syllogism does not take into account any system of property rights of the 
sort that Locke himself envisioned, either in one’s self or in tangible externals. Rather, it 
becomes necessary to recast this theory in more consequentialist terms.  Once that is 
done, the gulf between property rights in tangibles and property rights in intangibles is far 
narrower than these theorists believe. The set of justifications used in the former carries 
over to the latter. The only question that remains is how the differences in the nature of 
the resources in question, whether copyright or patent, (an issue that arises as well with 
tangible forms of property) require a distinctive configuration of property rights in the 
appropriate area. Therefore, we may have some justification for the limited terms of both 
patents and copyrights, and for their sharply different lengths. Further, we may 
understand the reasons for a privilege of fair use in copyright, but not in patent. But in 
thinking of these differences, we should not forget the close parallels between actions for 
trespass and those for infringement, or for the use of both damages and injunctions in 
both these areas. Intellectual property rights rest on some plausible but not infallible 
assumptions, but so too do property rights in land and water. Once we lay out the 
differences, ironically, we can understand the theoretical unity that cuts across these 
various areas. In accordance with this general plan, part I of this paper examines the 
natural law justifications for property in one’s own person and in tangible objects. Part II 
of this paper carries the analysis over to the law of copyright. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11Bell, supra note 8, at 3. 
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LIBERTY, LABOR AND AUTONOMY.  
Labor  
The starting point for the justification of tangible property is the famous statement 
of Locke that reads “Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, 
yet every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself. 
The labour of his body and the work of his hands we may say are properly his.”12 Here, 
of course, the point is treated as a departure from the common pool norm for all that 
follows in his system. The most important deviations are the rules that speak about the 
expenditure of labor as a means to acquire private property by “mixing” one’s labor with 
land or other external objects, which are said to be owned in common.13 However, this 
theory is subject to a wide range of important objections as it relates to liberty, property 
and their intersection. Many of these objections bear on the question of whether we 
should recognize property rights in general, or copyright in particular.  
At the starting point, Locke’s theory does not read like a paean to utilitarianism in 
particular or any species of consequentialism in general. Ironically, it does not appear to 
fall into the class of natural law theories that rest on some “backward looking” 
deontological claim, in which the question of right depends solely on all that has gone 
before, and not on those things that are likely to come afterwards.14 Nor is it clear that the 
claims can be conveniently slotted into theories of this sort. The most obvious point of 
criticism is that there is quite literally nothing that anyone has ever done to “deserve” the 
creation of ownership rights in his own person. Further, it does not matter what terms are 
                                                 
12Locke, supra note 1, at ch. 5, ¶ 27. 
13Id. (“Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath 
mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his own property.”). 
14See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING; ESSAYS IN THE 
THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 81ff (1970).  
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used, whether autonomy or self-ownership—assuming that some differences ride on the 
choice of terminology. The blunt truth is that these tangible things are gifts of nature, in 
the sense that no one has committed any form of labor to create them. The point receives 
its most forceful elaboration in the critiques that John Rawls has made of the claim that 
individuals own, or are otherwise entitled to their own (not normative, but descriptive—
or so one assumes) talents. Rawls noted that it is “morally arbitrary” for any individual to 
be treated as the sole owner of his own talents because the determinants of their value lie 
at the random fortunes of birth and upbringing combined with the demand for these 
talents in some concrete social setting, which in some settings the talents are awarded 
enormously, but in others not at all.15  
We can explore this counterargument to Locke on a number of grounds. First, 
many of our most important endowments from good health to good character and 
intelligence do depend upon the luck of genetic lottery, many of which no legal system 
can correct. For example, people born with fatal conditions, such as Tay-Sachs disease, 
will live short and unhappy lives no matter what form of income distribution is 
implemented in their favor. However, the Make-A-Wish Foundation does marvelous 
work for young persons with fatal maladies. It does not equalize fortunes across 
individuals, but at the same time it would be a mistake to adopt the posture of genetic 
determinism to the exclusion of social factors. Once we control for social factors, it 
seems indefensible to say, as a general matter, that across the board individuals’ 
successes and failures depend in large measure on circumstances beyond their control. 
There are many people who are raised in adverse circumstances and achieve success in 
                                                 
15See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 310 (1971) (“A person’s character depends in large part upon 
fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can claim no credit. The notion of desert seems not 
to apply to these cases.”). 
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life because they have, by dint of their own labor, developed the character and skills 
needed to allow them to succeed in the general world. By the same token, we all know 
many individuals who, as children, enjoyed every advantage of family and fortune only 
to make a mess of their own lives. It takes a good deal of confidence to believe that we 
have a strong knowledge of the determinants of individual success. 
 The Rawlsian response could come in the form of a regression of the sort that 
claims these personal virtues are derivative in large measure on the labor, care and 
comfort supplied by parents, often at great sacrifice to themselves. These individuals 
might have some claim of moral desert in virtue of what they have supplied their 
children. They have indeed engaged in activities that qualify under some “desert theory,” 
looking backward to their past actions. But so what? If they choose to make gifts of 
services to their children, why cannot they transfer the fruits of their labor to their 
children in the same way that they leave them a share of stock or a family keepsake? 
Perhaps the answer lies in the idea that we do not allow individuals to make gifts of what 
they have created, even to their loved ones. There is a long tradition of propertied 
individuals such as Andrew Carnegie and Bill Gates who are in favor of very steep death 
taxes. If this is correct, the argument has shifted, at least in part, from justice in the 
acquisition of liberty and property to justice in transfer. The level of control that the state 
(i.e. other people) exercises over each individual becomes ever more extensive. If people 
do not own their own talents, they cannot transfer the fruits of their labor to anyone else 
either, or so it would appear.  
The strongest opposition to the idea that individuals do not deserve to own their 
own labor comes, however, from this simple question: if I do not deserve the fruits of my 
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labor, genetic endowments and parental assistance, then who does? If these elements are 
regarded as insufficient to establish a claim that each person owns his own labor and the 
fruits thereof, on a desert theory, they are surely not sufficient in any form or 
combination to allow any other person to claim those ownership rights in my labor. 
Reciprocally, I cannot claim ownership rights of any sort in their labor. After all, what 
possible desert do we have in the labor of others to which we have contributed nothing of 
any sort? Therefore, the rejection of the Lockean claim on individual self-ownership 
cannot be read as an argument that it fails the criterion of “desert,” where the implicit 
subtext is that some other unspecified allocation passes that test. Quite the contrary, if the 
Lockean theory fails because it does not meet the standard of desert, then no other desert-
based allocation is possible. Nor should we think otherwise. Nature (in the literal sense) 
has provided some freebies for us all. So long as there are unearned elements, it is not 
possible for all things of value to be earned under any version of the desert theory. The 
idea of desert becomes a siren and a sink-hole. We have to look elsewhere to justify any 
theory of property, private or common.  
Unfortunately, this exacting use of the desert standard comes at a real cost 
because it drives a wedge between the everyday uses of the term desert and its 
philosophical deconstruction. “I deserved to get into college, obtain a job, win a prize, or 
indeed anything else in the world” is now to be treated as an otiose statement by 
individuals who just don’t get the moral arbitrariness that clouds their ostensible personal 
achievements. Further, these critics leave completely undetermined just who should get 
the benefit of all the elements that are thought in combination to be insufficient to justify 
RAE:PFF-Copyright 4/12/04 9 
a claim on desert: genetic endowment, individual efforts, and parental instruction and 
concern.  
There is a different way to look at the situation, which I think corresponds much 
more faithfully to ordinary sensibilities. No one doubts that the success in any given 
venture depends on some combination of individual effort and plain-old ordinary luck. 
Raoul Berger worked on an obscure history of impeachment, and lo and behold the 
Nixon impeachment loomed large just after the book was published.16 The book’s 
success was a combination of luck and skill. However, no one in ordinary discourse 
thinks that he has to abandon the extra royalties that he obtained from the exceptional 
sales, especially to some undifferentiated group of individuals who could not be asked to 
contribute a dime if the book flopped totally from indifference. Our social attitude, 
therefore, is that any individual who contributes the labor to a particular project gets to 
keep the gains (subject of course to the contractual claims of others who joined with him 
in the project) even if these result in some portion from pure, old fashioned luck.17 The 
point that we make here is quite simply this: the usual skepticism about desert establishes 
indubitably that no one can make out a claim that 100 percent of any development is due 
to individual effort. It therefore follows that society allocates the output, subject to 
contractual claims to the individuals who contribute the lion’s share of the material. In so 
doing, we reject any claim that the level of entitlement has to be “proportional” in some 
sense to the amount of effort that has been put into business. This proportionality cannot 
be satisfied even in robust competitive markets, which after all still allow—and to an 
                                                 
16RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT (1970). 
17For my defense of this point, see Richard A. Epstein, Luck, 6 SOC. PHIL. & POLICY 17 (1988). 
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Austrian, indeed encourage—supracompetitive returns, at least in the short run, to those 
individuals able enough to create or occupy a new market niche.18  
At this point, the argument may well veer to the consequentialist side of the line. 
Let there be no clear claim of desert that covers the full amount of the gain, then the issue 
arises—how ought that unearned gain be divided? The problem here is the inescapable 
question of joint creation. To assign that gain to people that had nothing to do with its 
creation shortchanges the original owner. To assign it to the creator allows him to keep 
the advantages of luck; yet by the same token it does not permit him to trench on the 
labor of any other individual. The great temptation here is to seek some form of 
apportionment, but that task is more easily said than done.  To claim that some fraction of 
the gain should go to other people (say, in the form of a progressive tax on income) does 
not decide which individuals should be entitled to what share. For example, should there 
be a special credit for those who have taken care of the person in his formative years, and 
if so should it be above any market wage that they might have received for their efforts? 
Or should it go to individuals in the same neighborhood, city, state, nation, or world? The 
annoying fact of jurisdictional boundaries between nations could not slow down any 
cosmopolitan urge, at least at the moral plane on which it is thus far conducted.  
At the practical level, two points are salient. First, this particular exercise has to 
be undertaken not only for this or that claimant, but for everyone who has ever received 
anything for his labor. Second, we cannot discharge this obligation by simply relying on 
some approximate test of income (with all its own problems of bunching and valuation) 
because there is absolutely nothing that says that individuals with the same levels of 
                                                 
18For an explanation of how other factors intrude, see John Christman, Entrepreneurs, Profits and 
Deserving Market Shares, 6 SOC. PHIL. & POLICY 1 (1988).  
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(earned or investment) income have benefited from the same level of luck. In sum, the 
effort to isolate “proportionate” contributions from luck and from effort falls apart 
because of the inability to conduct sensible measurements over countless individuals for 
countless periods. It would be so defective that it is in the long run interest of everyone to 
abandon any effort to isolate and reallocate the “unearned increment” (or decrement) that 
attaches to human labor. A rough and ready rule, therefore, that follows the naïve sense 
of desert works better in practice than any overt system that seeks to divert wealth to 
other individuals who are less deserving than the person whose labor created that wealth 
in question within the rules of the game. Hitmen need not apply.  
At this point we can start to see the connection between the traditional natural 
appeal to theories of desert that rely on the labor theory of value, and the consequentialist 
situation that seeks, as I would have it, to create rules that in the long-run create win/win 
situations—call these Pareto improvements—for the vast run of the population. Each of 
us, ex ante, is better off waiving any inchoate claims against the labor of others on 
condition that they waive their claims in return. The purpose of this massive renunciation 
of weak class claims is not to guarantee some perfect allocation of the goods of the 
universe. It is the more mundane task to identify at low cost clear owners of labor so as to 
assure the security of investment and exchange that promotes long term productive 
wealth. It is not an accident that those who accept the self-ownership of individual labor 
tend to be strong devotees of the market system, because they see the deleterious effects 
that come from the perverse incentives that arise from any system that is blind to self-
interest and purports to operate on the principle “from each according to his ability, to 
each according to his need.” It is only those who remain mired in philosophical doubt that 
RAE:PFF-Copyright 4/12/04 12 
see the ambiguities over desert as yet another nail in the coffin of market capitalism.19 
Engaging in a case-by-case examination of the determinants of desert lets philosophical 
doubt sow administrative confusion in the countless practical decisions of each day. At 
this point, it is best to go back to an indirect form of consequentialism with roots in the 
earlier work of David Hume,20 who counseled against judging the soundness of social 
institutions by the way in which they play out in some individual case. These roots also 
appear in the earlier writings of John Rawls, who gave consequentialist judgments a 
larger role in evaluating social institutions, rather than looking solely at individual 
cases.21 For the sound operation of the legal and social system, we must understand why 
the larger practices make sense over the broad domain of cases, such that we can 
formulate a general rule that is not exposed to constant counter attack on a case-by-case 
basis.  
 Property  
On balance there is sufficient reason to accept the general proposition that all 
individuals have exclusive rights to their own labor, at least as an initial presumption. The 
next question that needs to be asked is how this carries over to the case for individual 
ownership of property. Here again, the most common form of the philosophical argument 
stems from Locke. Locke saw the initial position as an uneasy mixture of individual 
ownership of one’s own labor and the fruits thereof, and common ownership of the 
natural resources found in the world, which on his account God has given to all men in 
                                                 
19See, e.g., Christman, supra note 18, at 16(“The relevance of this [rejection of moral desert in labor], if 
nothing else, consists in dislodging another pillar in the already shaky moral foundation of freemarket 
capitalism.”). 
20See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 502 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2nd 
ed. 1978) (1740).   
21See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 3 (1955) (noting that it is sound to 
be a retributivist in cases of individual criminal offenses, even if it is important at the system level to 
understand the consequentialist (i.e. deterrence) justifications for various forms of punishment).  
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common.22 But here again his account runs into a parallel difficulty to that which is raised 
in connection with the individual ownership of one’s labor: how does one account for the 
unearned increment that goes to each individual who has by his labor taken something 
out of the common?  
 Here there are several ways in which to attack this question. One quick dismissal 
is based on a terminological objection. It is not possible to mix labor with property, so 
that Locke’s argument fails as a misguided metaphor. This position is taken by Jeremy 
Waldron, who writes that the entire enterprise fails at this basic level. Most notably he 
contends that:  
(P) Individual A mixes his labour with object Q, seems to involve some sort of 
category mistake. Surely the only things that can be mixed with objects are other 
objects. But labour consists of actions, not objects. How can a series of actions be 
mixed with a physical object? 23  
Yet that “impossibility” takes place all the time. In ordinary business transactions, 
it is common for one person to contribute labor and another capital to a joint enterprise. 
The mixing of labor and property can also happen by inadvertence or mistake. As I shall 
discuss later, the Roman Law and common law doctrines of merger all took as a common 
case the situation in which the labor of A applied to an object that was owned by B. The 
situation is common enough that one needs a set of rules to analyze it, which could not be 
done if the entire question of sorting out the relative contributions made no sense at all.  
The real objections to this position must be more substantive.  The first of these is 
to note that some portion of the problem lies in Locke’s specification of the initial 
ownership position with respect to natural resources. Most concretely, he gives no 
                                                 
22Locke, supra note 1, at ch. 5, ¶ 26. 
23Jeremy Waldron, Two Worries About Mixing One’s Labour, 33 PHIL Q 37, 407 (1984). This argument 
was brought to my attention in Mossoff, supra note 7, who criticizes the point on other grounds. 
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account as to which, and if so, why resources should be regarded as owned in common. 
In this regard he is surely at odds with much of both the Roman and the common law 
tradition. It is instructive in this regard that Justinian’s Institutes begins its discussion of 
property with a compilation of those natural resources that are indeed owned in 
common—the air, the water, and in the most complex form, the beach.24 But it is equally 
clear that Locke was not sensitive to the consequences that attach to common ownership. 
To be sure, he deals with the question of water briefly in his essay, but in general does 
not understand how the system of property rights works. At one point he observes as 
follows: “Though the water running in the fountain be every one’s, yet who can doubt 
that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out.”25 But this misses the point. Regimes of 
common ownership contain complex bars against the creation of private property by 
capture or occupation. It may well be that individuals can draw some water out of the 
river, but they could never claim the river as their own, by adding to it labor that allows 
them to separate it from others. The river is kept as a common in order to preserve its 
“going concern” value for transportation, fishing, recreation and the like.26 Likewise, 
Locke does no better when he writes that “Nobody could think himself injured by the 
drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the 
same water left him to quench his thirst.”27 The question is not what the adverse 
consequence of one large draught would be, but rather the systematic consequences of 
multiple draughts, or worse diversions from the original river for irrigation and otherwise: 
                                                 
24J. INST. 2.pr.  
25Locke, supra note 1, at ch. 5, ¶ 29. 
26See Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970     (1985). 
27Locke, supra note 1, at ch. 5, ¶ 33. 
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he ignores the problem of the common pool in his statement of the issue.28 Yet water law 
prevents individuals from taking as much water out of the common as they can. It 
follows, therefore, that the initial image of land, things, or animals as common property 
does not augur well for a system of individual ownership. Thus, it is instructive to note 
that the legal system in dealing with the questions of the rights to occupation (of land) 
and capture (of animals) does not start with the image of these resources as res commune. 
Rather, it treats each of them as a res nullius—a thing owned by no one— so that the 
occupation of land or taking of a chattel does not take any interest held by others in 
common. 
To see the importance of not treating tangible property as communal in the initial 
position, it is useful to consider the law’s treatment of those situations in which one 
person takes the land or chattels that another owns, and converts them to his own use. 
The classical legal texts on this subject all start with cases similar to the following 
example: I own a slab of marble that you take by mistake, from which you now carve a 
statue. Who owns the statue? What rights, if any, inhere in the nonowner? The answers to 
these cases are not easy, but for all their differences and variations, they never result in 
the Lockean solution that vests the entire ownership in the party whose labor improved 
material things owned by one or more other persons.  
For these examples, it is only possible to indicate some of the key elements.  The 
classical law often allows the person with the distinctive attribute (the sculptor) to keep 
the thing, while giving a substitute slab (or its cash equivalent) to the owner of the 
alternative input. However, partnerships are never created between the two parties: 
relationships of trust do not work well between individuals who are brought together by 
                                                 
28See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).  
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happenstance and chance. In essence a rule of forced exchanges dominates the matter, as 
the party who gets the thing is required to pay just compensation to the party who is 
required to surrender his interest in the thing, usually measured by its unimproved 
value.29 
Here we can convert these problems into the Lockean problem by assuming that 
the thing that one person takes is in fact owned by a group of other individuals in 
common. How then does the logic of the private law apply to this situation? The first cut 
into the problem is to distinguish between those people who take innocently from those 
who take in bad faith. The definition of an innocent party is not someone who commits 
no wrong. Rather, it is a person who takes and converts property out of justifiable 
ignorance of the property holdings of another individual. For instance, one who takes 
gold off of another’s property, believing it to be his own property, is considered an 
innocent converter.30 The bad faith converter is, in contrast, one who takes with 
knowledge of the ownership claims of others.  
In dealing with innocent conversions, we have the allocations noted above. The 
converter therefore should be treated as an owner of that segment taken, but he does not 
get the free and clear title that Locke attributes to him. In the first place, if he has taken 
more than his pro rata share, he must accept a lien on his property for the excess. Also, he 
must surrender all claims to the property that remains in the common. Yet no one thinks 
that the person who captures an animal or occupies land thereby suffers a diminution in 
his right to use rivers or breathe air. The model of partition and severance, which is 
sometimes used in cases of common property, does not explain how any individual owner 
                                                 
29See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 116-118 (1995). 
30See, e.g., Maye v. Tappen, 23 Cal. 306 (1863). 
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gets title free and clear by taking something from the common. That model also assumes 
that the person who takes property is an innocent converter. This assumption could only 
be correct if the rules in question allowed the universal right of separation, which is the 
very point in issue. One way to make that claim is to depart from the usual private law 
rules and to note that the claims of necessity allow the separation in question to take 
place, which of course is the line that Locke takes.  
The case for private property is still weaker if we treat all individuals as bad faith 
converters of common resources because they know their legal status. The bad faith 
converter is an all around loser. First, he does not get to keep the thing. Also, when he 
returns it to its (common) owners, he does not receive any compensation for the labor or 
materials that he has added to the thing that he has taken. If therefore we follow the 
private law analogies on this subject, treating all natural resources as though they were 
owned in common has the unpalatable consequence that all individuals who (in bad faith) 
convert common property to private use have to return what they have taken, without 
compensation for their improvements. From there it is but an easy step to reach the 
conclusion that they can be enjoined from the taking, just as they could be enjoined from 
damming up the river, or blocking access to the ocean. Both of these examples are indeed 
common property, in law as well as in philosophy. This outcome is not the set of results 
that Locke had hoped to achieve by mixing private labor with commonly owned natural 
resources. However, it follows inexorably from his description of the initial ownership 
position. 
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These problems are sidestepped by treating land, chattels and wild animals as res 
nullius.31 The shift in terminology has important consequences with respect to the 
aforementioned merger problem. It is no longer possible to say that the appropriation of 
an unowned object results in the conversion of the interest of any other person. Hence, 
the individual is now entitled to take as much as he pleases of these resources, and does 
not have to worry about the consequences that are imposed on other individuals. In fact, 
this position is the classical Roman and common law one. 
The adoption of this position has with it several powerful advantages. For one 
thing, it allows the use of a quick and reliable test to identify the owner of each object, 
which in turn allows for orderly use, recombination and disposition of natural resources. 
The number of cases in which complications over hot pursuit will arise is small, 
notwithstanding the deserved celebrity of Pierson v. Post.32 In addition, this rule prevents 
giant sized holdout problems from taking place, the inevitable result if universal consent 
was needed to remove something from the commons. It is just that nightmarish spectacle 
that drove Locke to opt for his labor theory of value.33 However, he did so at a cost to his 
overall theory. The basic intuition behind the labor theory is that the huge bulk of the 
value of any given asset derives from the productive labor added to it, which is probably 
all that he meant when he used the metaphor “mixing” labor with natural resources.34 
This analogy may be true of stony farmland, but it is obviously not true of the abundant 
Arabian oil. 
                                                 
31See, e.g., G. INST. 2.66; J. INST. 2.1.12.  
323 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). The now celebrated dispute between Popov and Hayashi over the 
capture of Barry Bonds’ record-breaking home run ball counts as one such case, but only because the San 
Francisco Giants did not stipulate the rule that governed its capture. See, Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 
2002 WL 31833731 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002). 
33Locke, supra note 1, at ch. 5, ¶ 28.  
34See Mossoff, supra note 7, at 158-159. 
RAE:PFF-Copyright 4/12/04 19 
 In addition, Locke also had to cope with the antecedent difficulty of how any 
individual came to have the right to add labor to objects in the first place, if he did not 
own them by initial possession. For instance, acorns must have received their owner 
when they were “picked up,” and not at some later point when they were carried home, 
boiled or eaten.35 It is important to see how this potent example reverses the sequence of 
the labor theory of value. After the fact when the item is owned and improved, it is 
tempting to say that ownership should be complete because of the enormous labor that 
the owner expended on the object. However, the real task is to adopt a rule that requires 
as little labor as possible in order to perfect title to the acorn, so that the owner can be 
confident that he will be able, by holding on to the external object, to keep the benefit of 
the labor that he creates. To take the other position has adverse consequences. If 
ownership were acquired, for example, only when the acorns were boiled, this legal rule 
would foreclose the possibility of storing the acorns for later use, since title to them 
would still be precarious. Likewise, land would have to be developed (to the dismay of 
conservationists) for title to be perfected.  The point of the mixing is to allow the addition 
of labor to natural resources to increase their value, and that objective is achieved by 
moving the point of acquisition forward to the earliest possible moment. Looking at the 
acorn will not do it; hot pursuit might well, and capture surely does. Locke in a sense has 
it all backwards. The purpose of the first possession rule is to allow for the easy 
acquisition of material things so that their owners will be in a position to expend labor on 
them. It makes no sense to demand the huge expenditures of labor as a precondition of 
ownership. Locke only alludes to that erroneous view because he wants to make the 
                                                 
35Locke, supra note 1, at ch. 5, ¶ 28 
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preexisting value of natural resources small relative to the labor used to improve them.36 
That might be true in some cases, but not for all. Land that needs to be cleared for 
agriculture requires much hard labor, but land in which deep pools of oil are oozing out 
of the surface requires much less. I have little doubt that Adam Mossoff is correct when 
he reads the word mixing as a metaphor for productive labor. But the more telling 
objection is that this recasting of Locke’s view does not save his theory, even against the 
example of the acorns. In contrast, the correct and simpler point is that taking something 
from the commons and holding it just marks off what one person has against another in a 
cheap way that gives notice, as possession often does, to the rest of the world as to the 
existence of the prior claim. 
The movement from res commune to res nullius escapes the serious objections to 
the theory of combining labor with external objects, but standing alone it does not answer 
all questions that the philosophical skeptic can raise relating to the troubled status of 
private property. One line of objection is that this definition of property remains 
necessarily inconsistent with the broad definition of liberty that is part of the endowment 
of each person—the precise claim that is urged with copyright. That liberty includes the 
ability to go where one wills, and this right of movement is necessarily limited by the 
creation of any system of private property, which converts free movement into trespass. 
The point has been argued extensively by Robert Lee Hale and G.A. Cohen,37 both who 
see the creation of any law of trespass as a limitation, often unjustified, on individual 
freedom.  
                                                 
36Id. at ch.5, ¶ 43. 
37Robert Lee Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCIENCE 
QUART. 470 (1923); G.A. COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM AND EQUALITY 55-56 (1994). I have 
critiqued their positions at length in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN CASE 
FOR CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 110-114, 132-138 (2003). 
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The blunt truth is that this challenge cannot be turned aside by some pat analytical 
response. It is conceivable that we could treat land as a commons like water and thus 
prevent its permanent occupation by any one. Early nomadic tribes followed just this 
pattern. However, the reason we are not still in this primitive state are the enormous 
advantages from the privatization of land, without which no one would invest in 
permanent improvements at his own expense that could be snatched away by anyone. The 
short answer to the question of why the law confers private ownership of these resources 
is the same as it is for labor. It works to the long-term advantage of everyone behind a 
veil of ignorance, so that these limitations on liberty are justified by the gains that they 
yield from the social ownership of property. The losses that people suffer from exclusion 
are small compared to the gains that they get both from their ability to privatize their 
labor and from their ability to enter into trade with those who have engaged in 
privatization. It is for this reason that Blackstone, in dealing with the first possession rule, 
noted that it was the product of the “implied consent” of mankind.38 Clearly, the term 
“implied consent” is again asked to do too much work. From a modern perspective, he is 
really saying that from a social vantage point, the creation of private property through 
acquisition is a clear Pareto improvement over a world in which each person enjoys (as 
per some commons) a blockade position against everyone else. Once again we get a form 
of closet consequentialism in the articulation of our legal rules, which came out into the 
open with Harold Demsetz’s short famous article on the functional justifications for the 
law of property.39 
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39Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967). 
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All this, however, is not that transparent, for even if one adopts the first 
possession rule, one has to determine what counts as “possession” within the meaning of 
the rule. Here there is a largely forgotten literature today that asks why, or how, someone 
keeps possession of a thing after he no longer grasps it in his hand.40 In some cases, it 
makes sense to allow possessory interests of limited duration only. For example, the short 
term use is preferred in the case of those who make temporary huts on public beaches. 
The limited use is consistent with keeping the beach open for transportation in the way in 
which permanent structures are not.41 But once we leave the commons the situation is 
usually otherwise. As Bentham described in one of his famous passages, the situation of 
limited property rights is most unfortunate from just about everyone’s vantage point 
because of the precarious nature of the possession that is so created. 
There have been from the beginning, and there always will be, 
circumstances in which a man may secure himself, by his own means, in the 
enjoyment of certain things. But the catalogue of these cases is very limited. The 
savage who has killed a deer may hope to keep it for himself, so long as his cave 
is undiscovered; so long as he watches to defend it, and is stronger than his rivals; 
but that is all. How miserable and precarious is such a possession! If we suppose 
the least agreement among savages to respect the acquisitions of each other, we 
see the introduction of a principle to which no name can be given but that of law. 
A feeble and momentary expectation may result from time to time from 
circumstances purely physical; but a strong and permanent expectation can result 
only from law. That which, in the nature state, was an almost invisible thread, in 
the social state becomes a cable. 
Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws were 
made there was no property; take away laws and property ceases.42 
 
In one sense it is clear that Bentham sought to set himself up in opposition to 
Blackstone, but in fact the two make exactly the same point.43 The theories of natural 
                                                 
40For the Roman treatment on this subject, see JOSHUA GETZLER, ROMAN IDEAS OF LANDOWNERSHIP, IN 
LAND LAW THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES (Susan Bright & John Dewar eds., 1998), and BARRY NICHOLAS, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW (1962). For the common law approach, see POLLOCK & WRIGHT, 
POSSESSION AT COMMON LAW (1888).  
41See J. INST. 2.1.pr. 
42JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 112-113 (4th ed. 1882).  
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rights in property cannot stand because the power of the state is needed to extend 
possession beyond the situations of actual control. The state that creates property can (by 
implication) limit its extent at will. But in fact his passage only establishes what the 
natural lawyers, as Blackstone forcefully argued, had long thought to be the inescapable 
conclusion of their own system. In Bentham’s choice of problems, the above passage 
exhibits a remarkable continuity of thought. In fact, his example of the deer points in 
exactly the opposite direction of what he believed. Any culture could, should, and would 
develop this same norm in dealing with the property rights of its members. The most 
primitive sense of possession only covers the actual grabbing and holding on to an object. 
Such a rule is manifestly inconvenient because it means that legal possession ceases 
when the possessor loses his grip on what is handled. Only by degrees, the term 
possession is extended to cover those cases where the physical control is relaxed because 
of the intention to retain ownership. The point is critical not only as a linguistic matter, 
but because of the simple truth that many standard Roman and common law remedies 
were keyed to “possession”—only the possessor had standing to bring the suit in 
question. When, therefore, Bentham refers to “least agreement between savages,” it is 
simply an elegant way of restating the implied consent argument in Blackstone and 
others. The rule that treats individuals as in what is sometimes term “constructive” 
possession of things that they do not continue to literally possess in their hands created 
such an enormous Pareto improvement that no one could oppose it from behind the veil 
of ignorance. Indeed, it is commonplace in both Roman and American law that the 
occupant of an estate need not prowl its boundaries to maintain a hold. Rather, “suffice it 
                                                                                                                                                 
43See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3-4 (noting the inconvenience of the transient 
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that he enters some part of the estate, but with the intent and awareness that thereby he 
seeks to possess the estate to its utmost boundaries.”44 Nor is it hard to infer the intention 
to possess the entire estate. Individuals with a modicum of self-interest will claim all that 
the law allows them to achieve through unilateral action. 
The last distinctive element of land is the rule that allows for acquisition of the 
surface to cover the rights to the earth (and minerals) below and the air above. Land is not 
two-dimensional, but it is not practicable in any way to require individuals to expend 
huge resources in order to stake out claims. Thus, we again encourage the private 
protection of some “unearned increment” because the key task of the system is to reduce 
the labor and complexity that is required to reduce natural things to private ownership. A 
legal regime that requires individuals to expend labor that is equal in value to the 
property acquired reduces the value of the property to zero. Any system that requires 
individuals to run through hoops in order to acquire these interests in property reduces 
their value pro tanto. Again, from an ex ante perspective, it is in society’s best interest to 
have as few barriers to the creation of private ownership as possible, and not as many as 
could be imposed.  
 In the end, therefore, any exploration of the rules that govern the acquisition of 
property have the same feel as those that deal with liberty. In both cases, there is an 
unearned increment of talent or wealth that is not deserved under some strong theory of 
individual moral desert. That objection, however, carries little weight in the general case 
because, if true, it means that no one else could mount a claim based on desert either. 
Therefore, the best solution is to develop some cheap rule that allows individuals to mark 
off property as their own as cheaply as possible. It is better that the unearned increment 
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be held by someone, rather than it be lost in the morass of competition to acquire 
ownership. With both property and liberty there are limitations that may well make 
sense. For example, one major issue is the common pool problem, which results in the 
overhunting of certain forms of wild animals that at common law are subject to unlimited 
capture. But these limitations are not designed to set liberty in opposition to private 
property, nor to challenge the legitimacy of either. Rather, they are designed to continue 
the process of creating long-term social improvement by sensible incremental 
modifications of a system of property rights. These issues are not without their 
importance for the area of copyright, where they help to frame so much of the current 
debate over the subject. 
LIBERTY AND PROPERTY—THE SECOND CUT IN COPYRIGHT 
The second part of this paper is intended to show how the tension between liberty 
and property plays itself out in connection with the law of copyright. In most settings, the 
common understanding is that the case for the creation of copyrights is, if anything, 
weaker than it is for ordinary forms of property. The individual act of acquisition of land 
or chattel means that the general system of self-help allows individuals to both define and 
protect their individual property rights. It is easy to imagine how a system of property 
rights is natural, in the sense that it does not take any state agency to mark off the rights 
in question. In this view, the rights come from acquisition, and the sole function of the 
state is to provide protection for them with the use of public force administered by an 
executive branch and enforced by a set of impartial judges. We can leave the legislature 
all to one side. 
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That solution is not possible with copyright. For while metes and bounds could 
work for land, and simple possession for most chattels, the only way to protect copyrights 
is through the creation of some system that allows for them to be posted and recorded, 
and that takes some form of state power. The demands on self-help are far greater in 
copyright than for real estate. With copyrights, one quite literally has to commit a 
trespass against another in order to make good on the claim. It is for this reason that the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that there is no natural right to property, given that it 
is, in a sense that Bentham would approve, the creature of the state, for which it ascribes 
overtly utilitarian justifications.45  The view becomes more credible that copyrights come 
from the top down even if rights in land and chattels come from the bottom up. Thus, 
Tom Bell argues that copyrights should be denounced because they are totally creatures 
of the state.46  
In another sense, the case for treating copyright and other forms of intellectual 
property under the natural rights framework is more attractive than this brief account 
suggests. The initial stumbling blocks for treating copyright with the natural rights theory 
of property are the following two: does a person own his own labor, and what happens 
when that labor is mixed with resources that are owned in common. On the first question 
there is nothing about the copyright situation that deviates from other uses of labor. The 
general argument in favor of strong protection of rights in one’s labor carry through 
against any claims that some theory of desert pulls us in the opposite direction. It does 
not seem correct to say, as Tom Bell has written, that the labor-desert justification of 
property gives a creator clear title only to the particular tangible item in which he fixes 
                                                 
45See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
46See Bell, supra note 8, at 3.  
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his creativity—“not to some intangible wisp of the metaphysical realm.” We do have a 
system of non-wispy copyrights at the present. While one might oppose their creation, the 
rights in question are capable of sale or licensing, are protected against confiscation and 
infringement, and are capable of valuation. One might as well give the same dubious 
description to ordinary contract rights, for which the government cannot take an 
assignment unless it is prepared to compensate the assignor for the loss of his entitlement.  
To be sure, Locke did not offer any explicit treatment one way or the other of 
intellectual property rights, which adds to his charm. But it hardly follows that his theory 
has no implications for the area. Indeed the labor theory of acquisition seems, if anything, 
stronger here precisely because intellectual property does not require any form of 
“mixing” with tangible forms. Rather, these types of property appear to be the result of 
pure labor, which the creator, therefore, cannot keep because first possession of a tangible 
object allows him only to protect the paper on which the draft is written, rather than the 
draft itself. Yet by the same token, the author has not taken anything else out of the 
commons and so does not run into the joint contribution objections that undermine the 
power of the first possession rule for tangible objects. The only function of legal 
intervention here is to protect that investment in labor, without any expropriation. 
In this regard, however, there is a second counter that must be met. It may well be 
that individuals do not pull material things out of rivers and woods when they work, but 
they do depend on a cultural commons of sorts for their inspirations and ideas. In light of 
this commons, it is possible to mount a desert-like attack on copyrights, as with other 
mental activity, by noting that all individuals are constantly subject to a wide range of 
external influences, which enrich their works. The argument thus goes that it is not 
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possible to think that some unmediated and flawless market registers their intrinsic 
personal worth. Indeed, some believe the creation of the copyright monopoly is one of the 
factors that prevents the proportionate response of return to labor.47 If that point were true 
with respect to the making of widgets, it is certainly true as well of the nameless author of 
the essay “Of Widgets,” whose success is parasitic on the inventors and fabricators of 
widgets. The information that is supplied depends on the contributions of large numbers 
of other individuals. The “author” is deconstructed into a vessel through which countless 
forms of influences are poured. Parental upbringing, education, literary influence, and the 
past recordation of popular events are all examples of these influences. How much credit 
could we give to Charles Dickens if his portrait of Wilkins Macawber in David 
Copperfield is based on his father? And how much if he has incorporated elements of the 
great writers of the past into his writing style without compensation or perhaps even 
acknowledgement? 
The answer to the specific challenge is the same as it is in the general case—
confession and avoidance. There is little question that all these influences come to bear 
on the individual author. But by the same token, it is possible to locate in one person, or a 
small group of joint authors, the creative spark or hard effort that took these disparate 
influences and melded them into a coherent work, worthy of our attention.  The others 
with whom the creator works can protect themselves by contract. The system of 
copyright ownership was right to fasten its attention on (un-deconstructed) authors, as the 
Constitution so requires.48 It thereby gives the entire claim to the one person who has 
contributed the lion’s share to the finished product, with the precise intention of slighting 
                                                 
47See, e.g., Christman, supra note 18, at 12. 
48U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. (“To promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”). 
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the indirect contributions of other individuals to this product. Do we want to treat as an 
author any person who forbore from killing or maiming the author while engaged in his 
creative efforts? Or even those who were the creative inspiration to the person who did 
the writing? The constant emphasis of these indirect effects overlooks the simple point 
that the author of a copyrighted work contributes—dare we say in equal measure—back 
to the common pool by the creation of images that allow others to continue with their 
work as well. Thus, these contributors get implicit in-kind compensation for their 
contributions, in their ability to use the creator’s works for their own creations. Therefore, 
so long as we think that the copyright law gives sensible incentives for the creation of 
new works, there is no reason to think that every dime of revenue has to be earned in 
order for all of it to be allocated to the author. Indeed in many cases, the “monopoly” 
element in the return is overstated because the exclusive rights often do not become 
economic monopolies, in light of the fierce competition for readers or listeners that is 
facilitated by the copyright law. 
This basic frame of argumentation also carries over to the clear conflict between 
copyright and freedom of speech, which in its essential form is analogous to the conflict 
between liberty of movement and the trespass laws. Trespass law is useful for land only 
because of the network of public roads and waterways that allows for movement between 
various plots of private property. Similarly, we have a common domain of ordinary 
speech and language that is outside the scope of the copyright law, which facilitates the 
creation of the writings that are properly subject to protection under the statute. The legal 
monopoly conferred by a copyright or a patent need not translate itself into an economic 
monopoly so long as there are close substitutes, as there are for every new popular song 
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that is released. As one wag (I know not who) put it, property and monopoly are not 
different sides of the same coin. They are the same side of the same coin. We cannot 
decide that copyrights present any social risks unless we think that they make barriers 
against the creation of new works. That risk, moreover, looks to me to be more critical to 
the patent law, especially with genetic materials, than it does to any song or musical 
work. No one has to use any particular song or story for a particular project, but can draw 
on a rich culture, including items that have fallen out of copyright protection. In contrast, 
it is quite difficult to conduct research on breast cancer unless one has access to the 
BRAC-I gene. Getting the right rules for this area is a difficult task. Everyone agrees that 
patent protection should be shorter than copyright protection. However, beyond that point 
there are deep, perhaps unbridgeable, differences of opinion, between those, like myself, 
who think that the problem is well handled by traditional doctrines and others who think, 
even more emphatically, quite the opposite. The lost use involved is of little consequence 
for any dynamic development of the arts, which need not be the case in patents. 
Copyright of course has implications for short-term use given that each song is still 
priced above marginal cost of production even in a competitive industry. Yet again, there 
is no reason to think that some undifferentiated interest in liberty is so strong as to snuff 
out any creation of property rights.  
On balance, as with tangible objects, the pairing of liberty and property seems to 
survive, if it does not exactly prosper. One way to look at this element is to analyze the 
reception that copyright law has in connection with freedom of speech, where the 
constitutional doctrines in question are anything but moribund. In this case, the usual 
judicial view of the subject is the opposite of that found in the Lockean literature already 
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quoted. Thus, for the Supreme Court freedom of speech begins at the point that the 
delineation of copyright protection leaves off, and this idea rests in a world in which 
intermediate or strict scrutiny is very much the order of the day.49 One way to solve this 
problem is to argue that the issue is one of definitions: copyright infringement is a wrong 
so that it cannot be justified under the First Amendment. However, to the serious analyst 
this counts as a form of question begging because the issue is in reality about whether 
Congress can create these rights at all. At one level that question seems otiose because of 
the explicit power to create copyrights found in Article I of the Constitution. But by the 
same token, it could be argued that the First Amendment requires that one justify the 
creation of the regime with reference to its purpose of the advancement of the useful arts. 
In the ordinary case, we could argue that this is indeed satisfied because the incentive 
gains from the creation of these exclusive rights justifies the restrictions on speech that 
are imposed.  
Even that inquiry, however, leaves open the further question of whether the 
balance of trade is sufficiently out of whack in some specific cases so that the balance has 
to be rethought or redrawn. The most obvious point is whether the fair use privilege, as it 
relates to criticism and comment on literary works, is something that is required by the 
First Amendment, which I think ought to be the case, even if it is not at the present time. 
But the issue comes up in other contexts as well, especially in relation to the duration of 
copyright protection, which under the constitution has to be for limited times only. This 
case is one in which the use of a Constitutional phrase is far less preferable than the use 
of a number. It is in contrast to the use of the twenty-dollar figure in the Seventh 
Amendment, which was far less useful than no number at all. The Constitution could 
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have picked anything from 1 to 1000 years (or different terms for patents and copyrights). 
This number would have been preferable because people would have known where they 
stood, and it would have avoided endless theorizing as to the purpose of so ill-formed a 
restriction.  As long as discounting is taken seriously, the value of the future life of a 
copyright could vary anywhere from 10 percent to 99.9 percent of the value of the use. 
The vague constitutional provision gives no guidelines as to which of these extremes 
should be regarded as best. 
In the general analysis, the first contrast between copyrights and real property is 
that there is no obvious reason to limit the duration of rights in real property.50 The long 
period of ownership spurs development; but since only one person can farm at any time, 
it does little to crimp utilization at the back end. With copyright, the possibility of 
multiple utilizations of the item, without exhaustion of its physical properties, allows for 
a realization of gain if the term is cut short. This gain is not found in real property, and 
makes copyright unique. But even here the point is not by any means decisive.  
The calls for permanent copyright protection (but rarely for permanent patent 
protection because of how technology overtakes invention) have been raised in many 
quarters: Samuel Clemens51 for one, and most recently by my redoubtable colleagues 
Professor William Landes and Judge Richard A. Posner.52 This argument recognizes the 
costs of exclusion but does not find them conclusive.53 The source of the uneasiness in 
their work is a concern about the possible deterioration of valuable properties when 
                                                 
50For a discussion of the variation in property rights types, see Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: 
Old Boundaries and New Frontiers (Addison C. Harris Lecture), 76 IND. L. J. 803 (2001). 
51Samuel L. Clemens, Copyright in Perpetuity, 6 GREEN BAG 2d 109 2002). 
52William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 
(2003). 
53Id. at 475-484. 
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placed in the public domain. At one level, this state of affairs in the public domain should 
be regarded as a good because the public domain status of the asset creates two real 
advantages. First, it eliminates the transactions costs associated with various licensing 
and sales arrangements, such as identifying holders of valid rights, negotiating deals and 
the like. Second, it permits the brand management of the asset so that it does not, in some 
sense, suffer from overexposure or incompatible uses. That these points cannot be 
dismissed at the general level is evident from the Congressional mandate in the Bayh-
Dole Act,54 which calls on private parties who receive government grants to earnestly 
consider whether to take out patents on the fruits of their research. The great fear of this 
act is that items that are left in the public domain will languish because any developer of 
the idea will be undercut by future imitators who can supply the same or similar products 
at a far lower price.  
 The question one must ask is how do these things play out outside the patent field. 
In this regard, it is imperative to distinguish sharply between the tradename/ 
trademark/right of publicity cases. Strictly speaking, the branding exercise is at stake in 
the first two types of cases, and in some instances in the third type. Socializing the name 
or mark makes it worthless for anything but decoration because it will fail in its function 
to relate the item branded back to a single source. In the cases in which the right of 
publicity is used for the same purpose, it is subject to the same kind of rationale. This 
rationale does not apply to those who wish to perform as Elvis Presley look-alikes, and a 
strong case exists for bifurcating the right and allowing the protection to be of indefinite 
duration, when used for purposes of identification or branding.  
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With the copyright system, however, the emphasis is not on branding but on 
performance, and here we do have extensive experience with materials that have fallen 
into the public domain. There are countless, often perverse, versions of Shakespeare that 
are produced everywhere today. The Shakespeare trust would probably not license some 
of these performances at all. Further, the trust would charge a hefty fee for the standard 
performances that they did license, and could easily place tight restrictions on the choice 
of sets, designs, actors and the like. Anyone is hard pressed to believe that Shakespeare’s 
star has been dimmed by the calamities committed in his name, or that the world would 
be a better place if the obvious restrictions on use could be achieved with the blessing of 
the state. For those copyrighted works (treatises and casebooks, alas, for example) that 
need revisions on three-year cycles to stay current, the duration of a copyright is of little 
consequence. However, the duration issue only counts for the literary works that are 
immortal, and for these works, the original judgment that they be for terms is correct. 
Further, the terms should be significantly shorter than the life plus 50 years that is 
contemplated for new works today. 
The question of duration is, of course, not only relevant to the situation for new 
patents. It is most salient for the recent decision under the Copyright Term Extension Act 
to lengthen the term of copyright protection for 20 years, both for new and existing 
patents.55 That statute was sustained by the Supreme Court in a careful decision of Justice 
Ginsburg, which paid too much homage to the rational basis test in reaching its 
decision.56 It now makes a real difference what approach is taken to the First Amendment 
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issue.57 If the rule is, dogmatically, nothing which is covered by copyright can offend the 
First Amendment, as the rational basis test can be easily read to imply, the CTEA is 
home-free without any examination of its content solely because it is a copyright statute. 
However, the analysis takes a very different view if one asks whether or not there is some 
social justification for the statute in the sense that it offers gains to others that justify, 
perhaps to a standard of intermediate scrutiny, the restrictions that have been imposed. 
Starting from this perspective, the obvious challenge to the CTEA is that it is a 
giveaway of public domain property to private individuals, for which the state receives 
nothing in return. Under the rational basis standard, that giveaway could be justified for 
the reasons mentioned above, namely, that it facilitates the coherent management of the 
various brands in question. The Mickey Mouse material might fall into this category in 
light of the consistent image that Disney has tried to project. This case raises an evident 
tension between the copyright protection that lapses and the trademark protection that is 
perpetual. In other cases, such as that of the Gershwin estate, the brand management 
argument looks still weaker. It is not as though Mozart or Beethoven have suffered 
because their music is off copyright. 
If the level of constitutional scrutiny is ratcheted up, a different set of 
considerations surely prevails.  Once it is clear that the various copyrights fall into the 
public domain, it is uncertain why they should be given away for free, when they could 
be resold or licensed to anyone, including their original holders. With this scenario, we 
could achieve whatever gains are available from brand management, but allow the state 
to keep some portion of the proceeds through the sale arrangement in ways that honor a 
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type of reverse eminent domain clause: nor shall public property be given for private use, 
without just compensation.58 The point is that even if the First Amendment is not 
offended by this giveaway, some version of the public trust doctrine is. Now is not the 
time to speak about the uneasy constitutional pedigree of this doctrine at the federal level. 
It is, however, appropriate to stress that even as a matter of sound policy, the privatization 
of copyrighted material could be handled by exchange instead of gift.  
CONCLUSION   
In sum, when we look at the situation with respect to copyright, it seems clear that 
the peculiar nature of the rights in question justifies rules that allow for limited duration 
and fair use, and perhaps some other restrictions. But as such they do not alter the basic 
tension that exists between liberty and property in the case of labor or natural resources. 
It is easy to conclude that the foundations of intellectual property law in general and 
copyright in particular are shaky if it is assumed that the foundations for individual 
autonomy and private property are secure on some unadorned version of natural law 
theory that relies more on self-evidence and less on functional advantage. But for years 
now, my own private campaign has been to insist that the strength of the natural law 
theories rested on their implicit utilitarian (broadly conceived) foundations, which require 
some empirical evaluation of why given institutions promote human flourishing and 
through it general social welfare. Under those tests all legal rules are imperfect 
adjustments and tradeoffs between competing goods.59 Quite simply, any system of 
private property imposes heavy costs of exclusion. However, these costs can only be 
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eliminated by adopting some system of collective ownership that for its part imposes 
heavy costs of governance. The only choice that we have is to pick the lesser of two evils. 
There is no magic solution for liberty or property that creates benefits without 
dislocations. But once we recognize that trade-offs are an inescapable feature of social 
activity, we could conclude that a sensible system of copyright is not such a bad trade-off 
after all.  
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